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Abstract
We present a polynomial-time algorithm that
always ﬁnds an (approximate) Nash equi-
librium for repeated two-player stochastic
games. The algorithm exploits the folk the-
orem to derive a strategy proﬁle that forms
an equilibrium by buttressing mutually ben-
eﬁcial behavior with threats, where possible.
One component of our algorithm eﬃciently
searches for an approximation of the egali-
tarian point, the fairest pareto-eﬃcient solu-
tion. The paper concludes by applying the
algorithm to a set of grid games to illus-
trate typical solutions the algorithm ﬁnds.
These solutions compare very favorably to
those found by competing algorithms, result-
ing in strategies with higher social welfare, as
well as guaranteed computational eﬃciency.
1 Problem Statement
Stochastic games (Shapley, 1953) are a popular
model of multiagent sequential decision making in the
machine-learning community (Littman, 1994; Bowling
& Veloso, 2001). In the learning setting, these games
are often repeated over multiple rounds to allow learn-
ing agents a chance to discover beneﬁcial strategies.
Mathematically, a two-player stochastic game is a
tuple  S,s0,A1,A2,T ,U1,U2,γ ; namely, the set of
states S, an initial state s0 ∈ S, action sets for the two
agents A1 and A2, with joint action space A = A1×A2;
the state-transition function, T : S × A → Π(S) (Π( )
is the set of probability distributions over S); the util-
ity functions for the two agents U1,U2 : S × A → ℜ,
and the discount 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1.
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In an inﬁnitely repeated stochastic game, the stochas-
tic game is played an unbounded number of rounds.
On each round, a stage game is played, starting in s0
and consisting of a series of state transitions (steps),
jointly controlled by the two agents. At each step,
both agents simultaneously select their actions, pos-
sibly stochastically, via strategies πi (for each agent
i). To avoid inﬁnitely long rounds, after each step,
the round is allowed to continue with probability γ,
otherwise it is terminated. The payoﬀ for a player in
a stage game is the total utility obtained before the
stage game is terminated. (Note that the continuation
probability γ is equivalent to a discount factor.) Play-
ers behave so as to maximize their average stage-game
payoﬀs over the inﬁnite number of rounds.
A strategy proﬁle, π =  π1,π2 , is a Nash equilibrium
(NE) if each strategy is optimized with respect to the
other. In an equilibrium, no agent can do better by
changing strategies given that the other agent contin-
ues to follow its strategy in the equilibrium. In a re-
peated game, the construction of equilibrium strategy
proﬁles can involve each player changing strategy from
round to round in response to the behavior of the other
agent. Note that an ǫ-approximate NE is one in which
no agent can do better by more than ǫ by changing
strategies given that the other agent continues to fol-
low its strategy in the equilibrium.
Our approach to ﬁnding an equilibrium for repeated
stochastic games relies on the idea embodied in the folk
theorems (Osborne & Rubinstein, 1994). The relevant
folk theorem states that if an agent’s performance is
measured via expected average payoﬀ, for any strictly
enforceable (all agents receive a payoﬀ larger than their
minimax values) and feasible (payoﬀs can be obtained
by adopting some strategy proﬁle) set of average pay-
oﬀs to the players, there exist equilibrium strategy pro-
ﬁles that achieve these payoﬀs. The power of this folk
theorem is that communally beneﬁcial play, such as
mutual cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma, can be
justiﬁed as an equilibrium. A conceptual drawback isthat there may exist inﬁnitely many feasible and en-
forceable payoﬀs (and therefore a daunting set of equi-
librium strategy proﬁles to choose from). We focus on
the search for a special point inside this (possibly in-
ﬁnite) set of solutions that maximizes the minimum
advantage obtained by the players. (The advantage is
the improvement a player gets over the payoﬀ it can
guarantee by playing defensively.) We call this point
the egalitarian point, after Greenwald and Hall (2003).
Other points can also be justiﬁed, such as the one that
maximizes the product of advantages—the Nash bar-
gaining solution (Nash, 1950).
Earlier work (Littman & Stone, 2005) has shown that
the folk theorem can be interpreted computationally,
resulting in a polynomial-time algorithm for repeated
games. In the prior work, the game in each round
is represented in matrix form—each strategy for each
player is explicitly enumerated in the input represen-
tation. This paper considers the analogous problem
when each stage game is represented much more com-
pactly as a stochastic game. Representing such games
in matrix form would require an inﬁnitely large ma-
trix since the number steps per round, and therefore
the complexity of the strategies, is unbounded. Even
if we limit ourselves to stationary deterministic strate-
gies, there are exponentially many to consider.
Concretely, we address the following computational
problem. Given a stochastic game, return a strategy
proﬁle that is a Nash equilibrium—one whose payoﬀs
match those of the egalitarian point—of the average
payoﬀ repeated stochastic game in polynomial time.
In fact, because exact Nash equilibria in stochastic
games can require unbounded precision, our algorithm
returns an arbitrarily accurate approximation.
2 Background
Here, we present background on the problem.
2.1 Minimax Strategies
Minimax strategies guarantee a minimum payoﬀ value,
called the security value, that an agent can guaran-
tee itself by playing a defensive strategy. In addi-
tion, an agent can be held to this level of payoﬀ if
the other agent adopts an aggressive attack strategy
(because minimax equals maximin). Given that mini-
max strategies guarantee a minimum payoﬀ value, no
rational player will agree on any strategy in which it
obtains a payoﬀ lower than its security value. The
pair of security values in a two-player game is called
the disagreement point.
The set X ⊆ R2 of average payoﬀs achievable by strat-
egy proﬁles can be visualized as a region in the x-y
plane. This region is convex because any two strat-
egy proﬁles can be mixed by alternating over succes-
sive rounds to achieve joint payoﬀs that are any convex
combination of the joint payoﬀs of the original strategy
proﬁles. The disagreement point v = (v1,v2) divides
the plane into two regions (see Figure 1): a) the region
of mutual advantages (all points in X, above and to
the right of v), denotes the strictly enforceable payoﬀ
proﬁles; and b) the relative complement of the region
of mutual advantage, which are the payoﬀ proﬁles that
a rational player would reject.
In general-sum bimatrix games, the disagreement
point can be computed exactly by solving two zero-
sum games (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947) to
ﬁnd the attack and defensive strategies and their val-
ues. In contrast, the solution to any zero-sum stochas-
tic game can be approximated to any degree of accu-
racy ǫ > 0 via value iteration (Shapley, 1953). The
running time is polynomial in 1/(1 − γ), 1/ǫ, and the
magnitude of the largest utility Umax.
2.2 Markov Decision Processes
In this paper, we use Markov decision processes (Put-
erman, 1994), or MDPs, as a mathematical framework
for modeling the problem of the two players work-
ing together as a kind of meta-player to maximize a
weighted combination of their payoﬀs. For any weight
[w,1 − w] (0 ≤ w ≤ 1) and point p = (p1,p2), deﬁne
σw(p) = wp1 + (1 − w)p2.
Note that any strategy proﬁle π for a stochastic game
has a value for the two players that can be represented
as a point pπ ∈ X. To ﬁnd the strategy proﬁle π for a
stochastic game that maximizes σw(pπ), we can solve
MDP(w), which is the MDP derived from replacing
the utility r = (r1,r2) in each state with σw(r).
2.3 Other Solutions for Stochastic Games
There are several solution concepts that have been con-
sidered in the literature. Generally speaking, a Nash
equilibrium (NE) is a vector of independent strategies
in which all players optimize their independent prob-
ability distributions over actions with respect to ex-
pected payoﬀ. A correlated equilibrium (CE) allows
for dependencies in the agent’s randomizations, so a
CE is a probability distribution over joint spaces of
actions. Minimax strategies maximize payoﬀ in the
face of their worst opponent. At the other extreme,
“friend” strategies maximize behavior assuming the
opponents are working to maximize the agent’s own
utility. Friend strategies are appropriate in purely co-
operative settings but can perform very badly in mixed
incentive settings.Deﬁne FolkEgal(U1,U2,ǫ):
// Find “minimax” strategies
Let (δ1,α2,v1) := Game(U1,ǫ/2)
Let (δ2,α1,v2) := Game(U2,ǫ/2)
// Make the disagreement point the origin
Let v := (v1,v2)
Let U1 := U1 − v
Let U2 := U2 − v
// Find “friend” strategies
Let (R0,π2) := MDP([1,0])
Let (L0,π1) := MDP([0,1])
// Find the egalitarian point and its policy
If R is left of the egalitarian line:
Let (P,π) := (R0,π2)
Elseif L is to the right of the egalitarian line:
Let (P,π) := (L0,π1)
Else:
Let (P,π) := EgalSearch(L0,R0,T)
// If game is like zero sum, compete
If minv(P) ≤ ǫ:
Return (δ1,δ2)
// Else, mutual advantage
Return π, modiﬁed to use threat strategies
α1 and α2 to enforce the equilibrium
Figure 2: Our approach to ﬁnding the egalitarian point
and a strategy proﬁle that achieves it.
Deﬁne EgalSearch(L,R,T):
If T = 0:
Return Intersect(L,R)
Let w := Balance(L,R)
Let (P,π) := MDP(w)
If P · w = L · w:
Return Intersect(L,R)
If P is to the left of egalitarian line:
Return EgalSearch(P,R,T − 1)
Else:
Return EgalSearch(L,P,T − 1)
Figure 3: Our search algorithm for intersecting the
convex payoﬀ region with the egalitarian line.
σw(Pπ) ≥ σw(R) = σw(L). If it is not strictly better,
the search ends. Otherwise, the new point is used as
either L or R and it continues.
The ﬁnal strategy proﬁle returned is found via
Intersect(L,R), which discovers the right way to al-
ternate between L and R to produces a payoﬀ on the
egalitarian line. Again, a simple linear equation suf-
ﬁces to identify this strategy proﬁle.
Figure 4 illustrates a step of the algorithm. First, note
the disagreement point v and the egalitarian line head-
ing out from it. The algorithm is given points L and
R such that L is on the left of the egalitarian line and
R is on the right. In the diagram, the line passing
through L labeled ¯ L is the set of points p such that
σwL(p) = σwL(L). Since L was returned as the max-
imum payoﬀ with respect to some weight wL, none
Figure 4: An illustration of the behavior of
EgalSearch.
of the points in the convex set can be above this line.
Similarly, wR is the weight that was used in the deriva-
tion of R and therefore no payoﬀs are possible beyond
the ¯ R line in the ﬁgure.
Next, notice that both L and R are the payoﬀs for
some strategy proﬁle, so both lie in the convex set.
Furthermore, any payoﬀ on the line between L and
R can also be achieved by some strategy proﬁle. The
weight w, derived by Balance(L,R), is the weight such
that every payoﬀ p along the line between L and R has
the same weighted value σw(p). The line is called ¯ LR
in the ﬁgure.
Putting these ideas together, consider what happens
when we solve MDP(w). We know the result will be
at least as high as the ¯ LR line, since we already know
there is a strategy proﬁle that can achieve this payoﬀ.
However, we also know that it can’t go above the ¯ R
and ¯ L lines. So, the solution is constrained to lie inside
the gray shaded triangle in the ﬁgure.
The point P is the hypothetical solution to MDP(w).
Since it is on the right of the egalitarian line, it replaces
R in the next iteration. The black triangle represents
the region that will be searched in the next iteration.
In the next section, we show that each iteration re-
duces the area of this triangle substantially, and thus
that a small number of iterations are needed to reduce
its intersection with the egalitarian line to ǫ/2.
4 Algorithm Analysis
The main open issue is to set the parameter T, which
controls the maximum number of search iterations in
EgalSearch. Since solving MDPs and the various other
steps each take polynomial time, the overall runtimeof FolkEgal is polynomial if and only if T is bounded
by a polynomial.
Let’s say we are given a triangle with area ν where
the corners are possible joint payoﬀs. Let point p be
the point in the triangle that maximizes minv(p). Let
point r be the point along the longest edge of the tri-
angle that maximizes minv(r).
Claim 1: minv(p) − minv(r) ≤
√
2ν.
To see why, let’s consider two facts.
1. For points x and y, if  x − y 2 ≤ δ, then y =
x+∆ for some ∆ = (∆1,∆2) where |∆1| ≤ δ and
|∆2| ≤ δ. It follows that minv(y) = minv(x+∆) ≤
minv(x + δ) = minv(x) + δ. Reversing x and y,
we ﬁnd |minv(x) − minv(y)| ≤ δ.
2. A triangle with longest edge b must have an al-
titude, h, where h ≤ b, otherwise it would not
ﬁt inside the triangle. Therefore, its area is
ν = 1/2bh ≥ 1/2h2. Thus, h ≤
√
2ν. This ar-
gument shows that for any point x in the triangle
and y on the largest side,  x − y 2 ≤ h ≤
√
2ν.
Combining these two facts proves the claim:
|minv(p) − minv(r)| ≤
√
2ν.
Claim 2: Figure 4 shows the generic situation in
which the algorithm has found points L and R us-
ing weights that result in the edges labeled with ¯ L
and ¯ R. The gray triangle is the remaining region to
search. The algorithm then performs an optimization
that uncovers a point P inside this region using weight
w. The process then repeats with the black triangle.
Note:
1. The angle at the “top” of the triangle gets wider
each iteration.
The fact follows because the new top vertex is
interior to the main triangle.
2. The area of the black triangle is less than or equal
to half of that of gray triangle.
You can visualize the gray triangle as consisting of
three shapes—a top triangle, a trapezoid, and the
black triangle. Note that the black triangle and
the trapezoid share the same height, but the large
base of the trapezoid ( ¯ LR line) is longer than the
base of the black triangle on line ¯ LR
′ (because
the gray triangle tapers). Therefore, the black
triangle is smaller than the trapezoid and so is
less than half of the area of the gray triangle.
Combining the claims, let pT be the point that maxi-
mizes minv(pT) in the triangle active in the Tth iter-
ation. Let rT be the point that maximizes minv(rT)
on the longest edge of the triangle active in the Tth
iteration. Let νT be the area of the triangle active in
the Tth iteration.
1. νT ≤ ν0 × 1/2T
2. minv(pT) ≤ minv(rT) +
√
2νT.
So, minv(pT) ≤ minv(rT) +
p
2ν0/2T.
If we want the diﬀerence to be smaller than, say, ǫ, we
need
p
2ν0/2T ≤ ǫ, or T ≥ log(2ν0/ǫ2).
Since ν0 ≤ U2
max, the number of iterations is polyno-
mially bounded in the main parameters of the problem
and the approximation factor. Each iteration runs in
polynomial time.
5 Experimental Results
To illustrate the kinds of equilibria produced by our
algorithm and to compare them to existing algorithmic
approaches, we devised a family of stochastic games
played on grids.
All are games played by players A and B. The grids
diﬀer in structure, but they all use the same dynam-
ics. Both players A and B occupy distinct cells of the
grid and can choose one of 5 distinct actions: N, S,
E, W and stand. Actions are executed simultaneously
and transitions from one cell to another are determin-
istic unless a) there is a semi-passable wall in between
cells (depicted as a dotted wall in Figure 5(b)), in
which case the player transitions to the desired cell
with probability 1/2, or, b) both players attempt to
step into the same cell, where the collision is resolved
at random by a coin ﬂip, so only one player ends up
occupying the desired cell and the other makes no tran-
sition. Walls are impassable and players cannot pass
through each other—attempts to do so result in no
transition.
Goal locations can be speciﬁc for some agent X (de-
picted as a dollar sign with subindex, for example,
5(a), 5(c), 5(d), 5(e)) or general (depicted as a dol-
lar sign without subindex, for example Figures 5(b)
and 5(c)). The game ends after any player gets to one
of its goals and a goal reward is given. There is a step
cost for each of the actions N, S, E, W, but stand has
no cost. Note that games are general sum in that it
is possible for both players to score by both reaching
goals simultaneously.
All games use γ = 0.95, $ = $A = $B = 100 and step
cost = −1. One exception is that the step cost = −10
for the asymmetric game1.
1This example can be reconstructed with a step cost of(a) coordina-
tion
(b) chicken
(c) prisoner’s dilemma
(d) compromise
(e) asymmetric
Figure 5: Grid games in their initial state. $X = goal
for agent X, $ = common goal
In our results, we include runs for four solution algo-
rithms. Security-VI uses minimax for each player. It is
guaranteed to ﬁnd an equilibrium in zero-sum games,
but not in general. Friend-VI uses a self-regarding
optimization strategy for both players—each behaves
under the assumption that the other player is trying to
help it (Littman, 2001). Such an approach can work
well in identical payoﬀ games, but since policies are
computed independently, it need not. CE-VI2 com-
putes a correlated equilibrium for the players at each
state. As a result, actions are guaranteed to be coor-
dinated, but such an algorithm need not converge to a
Nash equilibrium in general. Our FolkEgal algorithm
will always ﬁnd a Nash equilibrium of the repeated
game.
one, but many more states are needed, so we decided to
keep the example small by modifying the step cost.
2CE-VI stands for all variants (Greenwald & Hall, 2003)
of CE (uCE, eCE, rCE), as their results were identical.
We now present results with the set of grid games in
Figure 5. For each game, for each solution algorithm,
we present the expected payoﬀs for each agent along
with an informal description of the returned strategy
proﬁles.
5.1 Coordination
algorithm agent 1 agent 2
security-VI 0.0 0.0
friend-VI 45.7 45.7
CE-VI 82.8 82.8
FolkEgal 82.8 82.8
This game is not terribly interesting, but the fact that
the players need to pass by each other without col-
liding makes it relevant to consider their interaction.
Friend-VI is unable to coordinate with the opponent
and sometimes will collide. Security-VI ﬁnds that the
worst opponent can always block the goal, so play-
ers stay still forever to avoid step costs. Both CE-VI
and FolkEgal ﬁnd a Nash equilibrium by avoiding each
other en route to goal, and both achieve optimal be-
havior.
5.2 Chicken
algorithm agent 1 agent 2
security-VI 43.7 43.7
friend-VI 42.7 42.7
CE-VI 88.3 43.7
FolkEgal 83.6 83.6
This game has an element of the game “chicken” in
that both players prefer taking the center path, but
given that the other player is taking the center path,
the side path is more attractive. We used a variation of
standard grid game (Hu & Wellman, 2003) in which
collisions are resolved by a coin ﬂip (Littman, 1994)
and there is no explicit collision cost.
The diﬀerence between security-VI and friend-VI in
this game is how an agent behaves if it cannot make it
to the center square. In the defensive strategy, once a
player does not get the center it will stay put because
it assumes (rightly) that the opponent will proceed di-
rectly to the goal. Friend-VI, on the other hand, will
naively continue moving toward the goal under the as-
sumption that the other player will let it pass. It incurs
a small step cost for its overly optimistic outlook.
CE-VI ﬁnds an asymmetric solution in which one
player is assigned to take the center and the other one
uses the side passage, through the semi-passable wall.
This policy is a Nash equilibrium in that neither player
can improve its reward unilaterally.
FolkEgal ﬁnds the solution halfway (0.5) along the
edge between vertices (83.14,84.05) and (84.05,83.14).
These points correspond to strategies in which oneplayer takes the center and continues beside the goal,
waiting for the other player to catch up. The two play-
ers reach the goal at the same time. The ﬁrst player
to go through the center incurs a slightly higher cost
because it must step around the goal before waiting,
hence the asymmetric (but close) values. The weight
of .5 means that each strategy is played with equal
frequency (strict alternation, say), in the equilibrium.
Note that both players score slightly worse than the
dominant player found in the CE-VI solution, due to
the cost of coordination. However, both the value ob-
tained by the minimum player and the total reward
for the two players is better for the FolkEgal algorithm
than for CE-VI.
5.3 Prisoner’s Dilemma
algorithm agent 1 agent 2
security-VI 46.5 46.5
friend-VI 46.0 46.0
CE-VI 46.5 46.5
FolkEgal 88.8 88.8
This game was designed to mimic the Prisoner’s
dilemma. The main choice faced by each of the two
agents is whether to move toward the shared goal lo-
cation in the center or whether to attempt to reach
the goal location further out on the side. If both play-
ers move toward the center, each has a 50–50 chance
of making it to the goal in two steps. If both play-
ers move toward the sides, each has a 100% chance of
reaching the goal in 3 steps. Clearly, moving to the
side is better. However, whichever decision its oppo-
nent makes (side or center), the player scores higher
by moving to the center.
The results closely match what happens when
bimatrix-game versions of the algorithms are applied
to Prisoner’s dilemma. Security-VI and CE-VI ﬁnd
strategies where both players move to the center (de-
fect). This strategy proﬁle is a Nash equilibrium.
Friend-VI is similar, although (as above) once a player
is unable to take the center, it continues to try to do
so assuming the other player will voluntarily get out
of the way. Again, this behavior results in additional
unnecessary step costs and is not an equilibrium.
We had expected FolkEgal to ﬁnd a solution where
both players move to their side goals, reserving the
center square as a threat (much like tit-for-tat). In
fact, FolkEgal found a slightly better scheme—one
agent gets the closer common goal (saving step costs)
but waits for the other to get to its private goal be-
fore entering. FolkEgal ﬁnd points (89.3,88.3) and
(88.3,89.3), and players alternate.
5.4 Compromise
algorithm agent 1 agent 2
security-VI 0.0 0.0
friend-VI −20.0 −20.0
CE-VI 68.2 70.1
FolkEgal 78.7 78.7
This game is much like the coordination game, but
with the twist that it is not possible for a player to
reach its goal without the other player stepping aside.
Security-VI adopts the worst-case assumption that the
other player will not step aside. Both players end up
staying still, as a result, to avoid step costs. Friend-VI
is actually even worse. Since both player assumes the
other will step aside, the two players simply ram each
other indeﬁnitely.
CE-VI converges to a very interesting strategy. Player
A steps into Player B’s goal and waits. Player A is
blocking Player B from scoring, but it is also allow-
ing Player B to pass. Player B walks to the upper
left corner and Player A moves back to its initial posi-
tion. Note that both players are now 3 steps from their
respective goals. At this point, both players move to
their goals and arrive simultaneously. One of the more
interesting aspects of this strategy proﬁle is that Player
B waits in the corner until Player A has stepped out
of the goal. The reason is that Player A will not at-
tempt to reach its own goal until it is sure it won’t be
beaten by Player B. Player B, by keeping a respectful
distance, signals to Player A that it is safe to move
and both players beneﬁt. Since both players are also
choosing actions in their own best interest, the result-
ing strategy proﬁle is an equilibrium.
This strategy proﬁle, while ingenious (and unexpected
to us), does not maximize the value of the minimum
player. FolkEgal’s solution is to alternate between L =
(79.6,77.7) and R = (77.7,79.6). The strategy proﬁle,
in this case, corresponds to one player moving to the
space between the goals, the other moving in front of
its goal and waiting, then both players reaching their
goals together in 5 steps.
5.5 Asymmetric
algorithm agent 1 agent 2
security-VI 0.0 0.0
friend-VI −200.0 −200.0
CE-VI 32.1 42.1
FolkEgal 37.2 37.2
This game was designed to show how the algorithms
react to an asymmetric starting position. Once again,
overly optimistic (friend-VI) and pessimistic (security-
VI) assumptions result in very low scores for both play-
ers.Note that the players again need to compromise.
Without Player B’s cooperation, Player A cannot
reach its near goal on the right. It also cannot reach its
far goal on the left, because Player B can trail behind
it and reach its goal before Player A arrives.
CE-VI discovers that Player B can “oﬀer” Player A a
compromise by hanging back exactly one square when
Player A moves to the left. As a result, both players
reach their goal locations on the left simultaneously.
The solution is a Nash equilibrium, although it is not
the egalitarian solution.
FolkEgal ﬁnds the egalitarian solution as a weighted
combination of the points L = (32.13,42.13) and
R = (85,−10) with weight approximately .1. Note
that point L corresponds to the solution found by
CE-VI. Point R corresponds to the strategy where
Player B moves to the right and lets Player A reach
the near goal location.
5.6 Summary
There are a few interesting generalizations to make,
based on these results. First, although CE-VI is not
guaranteed to ﬁnd a Nash equilibrium, it did so in all 5
games (including games that were designed speciﬁcally
to thwart it). We were surprised at the robustness of
the algorithm.
CE-VI only found the egalitarian solution in one game,
however, whereas FolkEgal found it every time. Folk-
Egal also has guaranteed polynomial runtime bounds,
whereas CE-VI is known to fail to converge in some
games (Zinkevich et al., 2005). Friend-VI performed
uniformly badly and security-VI, or foe-VI (Littman,
2001), often returned a Nash equilibrium, but one with
worse overall performance.
6 Future Work
This paper shows how an egalitarian Nash equilibrium
solution can be found eﬃciently for repeated stochastic
games. Future work will attempt to generalize these
techniques to repeated games on trees (Littman et al.,
2006) or DAGs and perhaps even repeated partial in-
formation games (Koller et al., 1996).
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